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SPURRING THE CREATION OF ACCOUNTABLE CARE OR-ganizations (ACOs) was a signature initiative in thePatient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010(PPACA). To achieve potential efficiencies by hav-
ing health care delivery coordinated bymultiple health care
entities (eg, hospitals, physician groups, clinics, health care
systems), the act invites such entities to integrate in ACOs
and instructs the Medicare program to share with an ACO
any cost savings it can demonstrate.1 Observers are express-
ing concern, however, that newly established ACOs are join-
ing health care organizations that otherwise would com-
petewith each other, thus creating networkswith dangerous
market power.2 It appears that the main purpose of health
care entities in forming ACOs may not be to achieve cost
savings to be shared with Medicare but to strengthen ne-
gotiating power over purchasers in the private sector.
This may be the latest chapter in the steady accumula-
tion of market power by hospitals, health care systems, and
physician groups, a sequel to the waves of mergers in the
1990s when health care entities sought to counter market
pressure from managed care organizations. The possibility
that ACOs might further concentrate health care markets
brings new urgency to understanding why these monopo-
lies are pernicious and to considering how government can
ensure that ACOs pursue efficiency rather than market
power.
Market Power and Health Insurance
Although the point is not generally appreciated, monopoly
power possessed by health care entities is more fiscally bur-
densome to consumers than monopolies in other mar-
kets.3 Ordinarily, a monopolist’s pricing freedom is con-
strained by consumers’ unwillingness to paymore than they
can afford or believe the product is worth. However, health
insurance in the United States hides the true price of health
services from patients and thus weakens the usual con-
straints on monopolists’ ability to raise prices. Conse-
quently, prices most consumers would not pay (and
monopolists would not charge) in the absence of insur-
ance are paid through higher health insurance premiums
for all Americans.
For legal, regulatory, and other reasons, health insurers
in the United States cannot refuse to pay the high prices im-
posed by health care organizations, even when the price ex-
ceeds the likely value of the service to the patient. Instead,
insurers are expected to cover any desired service deemed
“medically necessary” by professional standards, whatever
the cost. Health insurance, therefore, enables monopolists
of health services to charge more than the textbook “mo-
nopoly price,” earnmore than the typical “monopoly profit,”
and capturemore consumer dollars thanmonopolists in other
industries.
Policy makers have been slow to recognize the dangers of
market power in health care. Inwhat has properly been called
a failure of antitrust policy,4,5 policy makers did little to stem
the accumulation of health caremarket power throughout the
1980s and 1990s. But the implications have been huge. For
example, hospital mergers have led to estimated price in-
creases of 40% in local markets.6 Dominant providers of in-
sured services pose a severe challenge to health care afford-
ability for individuals and for the nation as a whole.7
ACOs in Theory and Practice
Still a roughly defined policy concept, ACOs are in theory
an attractive solution to problems stemming from the com-
plexity and fragmentation of the health care delivery sys-
tem.8 Together with good information systems and compen-
sation arrangements, vertical integration of complementary
health care entities can achieve important efficiencies by re-
ducingmedical errors, obviating duplicative services and fa-
cilities, and coordinating elements needed to deliver high-
quality, patient-centered care.9
However, the PPACA invites not just vertical integration
of complementary elements but also horizontal integration
of competitors. Organizers of ACOs are forging collabora-
tions among entire markets of physicians and hospitals, en-
tities that would otherwise compete with each other. Given
the extraordinary threat to economicwelfare that health sec-
tor monopolies pose with health insurance in the picture,
horizontal consolidation in the form of ACOs could per-
vert a good policy idea for bad ends.
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Antitrust and Regulatory Solutions
Despite past failures, antitrust law remains a vital tool in keep-
ing health care markets competitive. The PPACA does not
protect ACOs from antitrust laws, and because health in-
surance confers enormous pricing freedom on dominant
health care organizations, the formation of ACOs requires
heightened, not relaxed, antitrust attention. In particular,
antitrust enforcers and courts should be skeptical of effi-
ciency claims and, as a matter of law, should focus their at-
tention only on potential efficiencies and competitive ef-
fects in private markets, ignoring the arguable benefits of
ACOs to Medicare.
Although conventional antitrust analysis allows effi-
ciency claims to be weighed against harms from increased
market concentration, the distorting effects of health insur-
ance in narrowly definedmonopolizedmarketsmake health
care a special case. Thus, although ACOs should be al-
lowed to integrate health care organizations vertically, sig-
nificant horizontal combinations should not be counte-
nanced unless the affected submarkets feature an ample
number of effective competitors. Because of the large num-
ber of markets and the seriousness of the potential threat
to economic welfare, regulators—either antitrust authori-
ties or Medicare itself—should impose a preapproval pro-
cess, with the burden of proof on ACO proponents, to pre-
vent the formation of ACOs that dangerously concentrate
health care markets.
Given its commitment to performance measurement,
Medicare should additionally require ACOs to meet nor-
mative or national standards of efficiency in serving both
private and Medicare patients. Because such a test would
measure performance in terms of risk-adjusted per capita
costs—implicitly incorporating both price and service
use—anACOwould have difficulty passing the test if it were
exploiting its monopoly power in the private sector. Medi-
caremight also condition its sharing of savings with an ACO
on the latter’s demonstration that its prices to private pay-
ers have not increased because of its acquisition of market
power; anACO found to be abusing its power could be threat-
ened with dissolution.
States also can play an important role in counteracting
the market power of health care organizations. Some states
might choose to institute rate caps, a policy that met suc-
cess in a few states in the 1970s and early 1980s,10 or to adopt
an all-payer rate-setting program. Although price regula-
tion might be palatable only if other efforts fail to curb the
market power of health care organizations, policy makers
should remember that the health care monopoly problem
exists today largely because horizontal mergers were per-
mitted to create large health care systems that failed to pro-
duce their promised efficiencies. Current health care prices
reflect the costs of these monopolies without many ben-
efits from integration.
Conclusion
Innovative delivery systems must be part of the solution to
cost and quality problems. Real benefits can flow from con-
nectivity among health care organizations as well as be-
tween health care entities and patients, reducing low-value
services, managing chronic diseases, and enhancing pre-
vention. However, organizations that achieve these goals can
take many forms. There are compelling reasons to experi-
mentwith organizational forms, as envisioned in the PPACA,
and to encourage competition among the most promising
ones. For example, rather than emphasize hospital-
centered ACOs that rely on “bricks-and-mortar” vertical in-
tegration, which is arguably obsolete due to advances in in-
formation technology, a clearer path in this era of ambulatory
care would be to build ACOs around multispecialty physi-
cian practices or independent physician associations that do
not include most of the physicians in a geographic market.
Such arrangements could lower overhead costs while im-
proving quality without exacerbating the health care mo-
nopoly problem.
Whatever the approach, the overriding policy goal must
be to achieve improvements in carewhile challenging, rather
than playing into the hands of, health care organizations that
seek to exploit market dominance. Properly regulated ACOs
can be effective instruments for solving the underappreci-
ated problem ofmonopoly in health caremarkets and health
care delivery.
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